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ABSTRACT  
Information security has received a great deal of attention from a number of researchers (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). 
However, there has been little research aimed at understanding the dimensions—within the organizational context—of 
information security success. The current study considers a large body of information security literature and organizes the 
research based on their findings. This taxonomy is used to develop a model for information security success. The utility of 
the proposed model within e-Government is considered. Finally the implications for research and industry are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As information systems have become increasingly integrated into the functioning of organizations of every type, the need to 
protect the information produced by those organizations and stored within their information systems has expanded. Response 
to this need has been the development of a myriad of information security programs. However, as organizations strive for 
“successful” information security and as threats to that security become increasingly sophisticated and invasive, no clear 
understanding of information security success and its underlying constructs has emerged. In fact, the current research is based 
on the assumption that measurement of the success of an information security program may be impossible without a clear 
understanding and operationalization of those constructs.  
As the value of information systems and significance of the information they protect rise, so too does the importance of their 
protection. Unfortunately, many firms have found the real value of effective security only after experiencing the negative 
repercussions associated with a security breach (Cavusoglu et al., 2004).  However, even as organizations have begun to 
recognize the importance of security, assessing its real value has proved to be challenging.  To identify key to IS success and 
their effectiveness within an organization will ultimately allow organizations to better utilize their resources (Zviran and 
Haga, 1999). In fact, successful information security involves a “well-informed sense of assurance that information risks and 
controls are in balance” (Anderson, 2003, p. 310). In spite of the wealth of research, information security and success have 
been treated generally as separate entities.  In fact, limited research has been aimed at developing and understanding the core 
dimensions of information security success.  The argument of the current study is that, without understanding the true 
meaning of information security success within an organizational context, attempting to measure it is, in effect, aiming at a 
goal that is moving, or perhaps nonexistent – certainly poorly understood. 
This research is designed to provide a starting point for developing a better understanding of the elements that comprise 
information security success within an organization. To that end, we will review literature present within the information 
security field and identify the dimensions constituting information security success, operationalize those dimensions, and 
create a model for ensuring IS success that can be tested empirically. Finally, we will evaluate information systems security 
success model in the context of e-Government and discuss appropriate implications. 
 
REVIEW OF INFORMATION SECURITY LITERATURE 
The review of information security literature was conducted as outlined by Webster & Watson (2002). We examined selected 
papers (no time period constraint) from information systems field using keywords capturing the definition of IS security. We 
also examined reference list of the reviewed articles to expand our list of articles and journals. 
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Data integrity has its roots grounded in the classic CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) triad of information 
protection. In the past most secure system development activities and organizational security policies have been exclusively 
based on these core principles (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006). The increasing importance of protecting information has 
resulted in a large amount of research primarily focused on the technical aspects (i.e., encryption, data and software controls, 
and hardware controls) of protecting information in a computer-based system (e.g., Anderson, 1972; Sandhu et al., 1996; 
Schneier, 1996). In reaction, researchers, such as Anderson (2001) and Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006), have become critical 
of a possible "over-reliance" on CIA issues at the cost of a more robust, organizationally-focused mindset. In fact, Anderson 
argues that information insecurity is as much due to “perverse incentives” as it is to weaknesses in the technical 
infrastructure. 
Information systems assurance has evolved in a manner similar to general information systems development methods 
(Baskerville, 1993), with a reliance on checklists and other “one-size-fits-all” measures aimed at finding the specific 
minimum control set that will best protect information systems in general. In addition, most research has heavily focused on 
keeping intruders out via use of intrusion detection and other technically-focused methodologies (Denning, 1987; Daniels and 
Spafford, 1999; Vigna and Kemmerer, 1999; Axelsson, 2000; Frincke, 2000). However, there is evidence that to best ensure 
the security of information systems within an organization, the need for a secure information system must be balanced with 
its functionality within the organizational environment (Baskerville, 1993). Therefore, weaving security into the information 
system while providing flexibility for organizational growth can be a challenge, particularly in emergent organizations. In 
these situations, generic checklists are often found to be inadequate (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002). These various factors 
have led researchers to become increasingly interested in reaching beyond the "one-size-fits-all" mindset (D'Arcy and Hovav, 
2007).  
A number of researchers, such as Anderson (2001) and Gordon and Loeb (2002, 2006), are studying the organizational value 
of information systems and how their protection supports and furthers the business as a whole. Developing an information 
security budget is itself a balancing act—maximizing value by investing the optimal amount in protecting assets is an 
important consideration (Gordon and Loeb, 2002). Although balancing risk and reward is an integral part of maximizing 
value, firms should not necessarily focus their investments on information sets with the highest vulnerability. Rather, a firm 
may be better off concentrating its efforts on information sets with midrange vulnerabilities (Gordon and Loeb, 2002).  
A further factor to be considered is the exposure of information assets to other organizations; Tanaka et al. (2005) found that 
the level of information security investment within an organization is directly linked to their shared assets and the 
corresponding vulnerability level. In addition, Arora et al. (2006) argue that the disclosure of vulnerabilities and the nature 
and timing of that disclosure affects the risk of organizational exploitation.  These findings are important, not only to the 
department managing the information system, but to the functioning of the organization as a whole.  
Campbell et al. (2003) found a highly significant negative market reaction to information security breaches involving 
unauthorized access to confidential data. In fact, certain market segments like Internet-specific firms and software vendors 
are subjected to even greater risk of losses due to a security breaches (Hovav and D’Arcy, 2003; Telang and Wattal, 2007). 
Understanding the risk to the organization and attempting to manage it at an acceptable level creates value, thereby 
facilitating the business. However, when attempting to understand how an information security program creates value to the 
organization, one cannot focus solely on economic aspects – socio-organizational considerations, such as effects on 
organizational culture, also offer value to the organization (Backhouse et al., 2006; Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006; Dinev et 
al., 2008; Drevin et al., 2007).  
Since the effectiveness of controls that are put into place to protect information assets are constrained by behaviors of human 
agents who access, use, administer, and maintain them (Vroom and von Solms, 2004; Stanton et al., 2005), it is clear that 
understanding information security success must consider the intervening power of users and their behavior. A growing body 
of research has focused on the user and their interaction with information security. One line of research deals with 
counterproductive computer usage and malicious extreme, insider threats (Dhillon, 2001; Siponen, 2001; Trompeters and 
Eloff, 2001; Schultz, 2002; Stanton et al., 2005). 
A second subset of user behavioral research focuses on the awareness of users towards the systems—both the information 
system and its protective technologies—with which they interact, Dinev and Hu (2007) have found that awareness of 
technology is central to the formation of user attitudes surrounding and behavior toward usage of protective technologies. For 
instance, awareness towards the negative consequences of spyware has been found to motivate users to develop positive 
attitudes towards protective technologies and their intention to use them (Dinev et al., 2008). Furthermore, research suggests 
that intention is affected by a number of external moderators, including codes of ethics (Harrington, 1996) and cultural 
factors (Dinev et al, 2008). These three findings suggests that user intention—ranging from the malicious to the beneficial—
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might allow them to either subvert controls protecting the information system or expand their knowledge of protective 
measures (Stanton et al., 2005).  
Based on the extant literature, it can be logically concluded that understanding the underlying dimensions composing 
information security success is important. The model predicting success with information systems security in organizations is 
provided in the next section.  
 
DEVELOPING AN IS SECURITY SUCCESS MODEL 
This research study builds upon the body of work by Shannon and Weaver (1949), Mason (1978), and DeLone and McLean 
(1992, 2003), to develop a model that would predict success with information security in an organization. DeLone and 
McLean (1992) extended the studies by Shannon and Weaver (1949), and Mason (1978) to develop a model that would 
predict IS success. Shannon and Weaver (1949) identified three constructs involved in effective communications.  First, the 
technical level of communications involves the accuracy and efficiency of the communication system that produces 
information. Second, the semantic level relates to the success of the information in conveying the intended meaning from 
sender to receiver. Finally, the effectiveness level is the result the information actually has on the user’s behavior.  Mason 
(1978) adapted the work by Shannon and Weaver in order to relate it specifically to information systems. For DeLone and 
McLean (1992), the interrelated dimensions of IS success were obtained by analyzing three levels of information presented 
by Shannon and Weaver, and Mason’s influence level, to yield six dimensions of information systems that would yield 
success.  
Based on extant security literature, it is clear that there are several dimensions that interact to form the information security 
experience within an organization. Table 1 presents the analysis of security dimensions in terms of the three levels of 
communication as advocated by Shanon and Weaver (1949). 
 
Communication 
Levels 
IS Security 
Dimensions 
Supporting Literature  
Technical Information Integrity, 
IS Assurance, 
Business Enablement 
Anderson (1972), Denning (1987), Sandhu et al. 
(1996), Daniels & Spafford (1999). 
Semantic User Intention, 
User Expertise 
Dhillon (2001), Siponen (2001), Trompeters & 
Eloff (2001), Schultz (2002), Vroom & von 
Solms (2004), Stanton et al. (2005), Dinev et al. 
(2008). 
Effectiveness IS Security Benefits Anderson (2001), Gordon and Loeb (2002), 
Campbell et al. (2003), Hovav and D’Arcy 
(2003), Tanaka et al. (2005), Arora et al. (2006). 
Table 1. IS Security Dimensions for Different Communication Levels 
    
The dimensions operating at the technical level are focused on information systems within an organization.  First, 
information security should attempt to ensure “information integrity,” which is defined as an attempt to ensure that data is 
precisely the same during transmission, receipt, and storage. Next, the information security controls should provide 
“information systems assurance,” which is considered as a guarantee of integrity and availability of the information system. 
Finally, the information security program should ensure “business enablement” and not hinder achieving organizational 
objectives effectively. This dimension captures the value provided by information security controls to the business. 
The semantic dimensions of security are focused on users and their interaction with the information system with specific 
attention to intention and knowledge. “User intention” refers to intentions of the users – ranging from beneficial to malicious 
– toward the information system and its protective measures, as defined by Stanton (2005). Finally, we will consider the 
user’s knowledge, or “user expertise” that could allow them to either subvert the controls protecting the information system 
or raise their knowledge of protective measures (Stanton, 2005).  
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In the end, these variables interact with each other for a net benefit. In our case, the “security benefits” are the cumulative 
effect of the relationship between information systems experience (technical level) and user experience (semantic level) 
within their organizational context. This benefit can have a positive or a negative outcome, depending on the inputs provided. 
Ultimately, when considering the overall success of an information security program, controls implemented by the 
organization are only part of the solution. The user behavior towards an information system and its protective mechanisms 
presents an intervening force that will affect – for good or bad – the final net security benefits. The model predicting success 
with IS security in organizations is presented in figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. IS Security Success Model 
 
CASE OF E-GOVERNMENT 
As stated previously, information systems are more important than ever within organizations. In conjunction with this, the 
Internet is having a dramatic impact on business operations (DeLone and McLean, 2003). This impact is creating change 
within all organizations, but perhaps most so within the government sector. The advent of e-Government, the intersection 
between traditional government and the new age of delivering services to citizens via the Internet, has necessitated a shift in 
the paradigm of protecting our national interests while serving the citizen in a most effective manner. These national interests 
include everything from banking to electrical systems that power our homes and businesses.  
In the past, government organizations have relied heavily on checklists and minimum-security requirements as their baseline 
to information systems security success (Baskerville, 1993). Furthermore, government entities are required to adhere to a 
variety of regulatory requirements such as the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and the Department 
of Defense Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP). These constraints add a layer of 
complexity not present within the standard industry environment. Mandates coupled with the changes presented by advent of 
the Internet age shape the important, but often begrudged, role information security plays within government sector. While 
industry has plunged forward with sophisticated techniques such as biometric access controls and intrusion prevention 
devices, government organizations are often merely struggling to define roles and responsibilities. “[An] industrial age 
organization makes a cyber-dependent government vulnerable and inefficient” (CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity, 2009, p. 
51). Understanding this effort, the proposed information security model could help government organizations focus their 
efforts on the dimensions of information security that are truly necessary to protect information assets.   
System security  
Government organizations, arguably more than any other, value integrity of the data transacted within their information 
systems, particularly at the highest levels of secrecy. In fact, the government so values the secrecy of its data that United 
States law strictly controls the export of cryptographic products to foreign governments. “Information integrity” measures the 
desired characteristics of the information itself (Flowerday and von Solms, 2005).  Attributes of this dimension are integrity, 
confidentiality, and authenticity. Integrity means “its outputs fully and fairly reflect its inputs, and its processes are complete, 
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timely, authorized, and accurate” (Boritz, 2004). Associated with this attribute is confidentiality, or the aversion of data 
disclosure to unauthorized individuals. Authenticity ensures that data, transactions, and communications are genuine for 
conduct of government operations.  
“Information systems assurance” measures the desired security characteristics of an information system. Information integrity 
relies on information systems assurance as “information has its integrity only when the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, 
validity, and processing methods are safeguarded” (Flowerday and von Solms, 2005, pp.606). One of the critical attributes of 
this dimension is the availability of IS, or the assurance that it is available when needed. Another critical attribute for a 
government organization is the response time. It is a measure of assurance that the IS will respond in a timely and efficient 
manner. Finally, reliability of IS is a crucial need for government organizations. Daily missions, from delivering mail to 
delivering a bomb, depend on the information systems being available and dependable. In addition to military operations, IS 
assurance ensures better service delivery to citizens, improved services for businesses, and empowerment through 
information. 
Enabling the operations of a government organization is very simple: without information security, the job cannot be done 
with confidence. In fact, Hale and Brusil (2007) argues that “enterprises that deal with the general public are missing out on 
business if they do not link security to business strategy …” (pp.526). CSIS (2009) describes the failure to secure cyberspace 
as “[diluting] our investment in innovation while subsidizing the research and development of foreign competitors” (p. 11). 
In current climate, mission assurance assumes importance for government sector. It is a measure of the ability to utilize IS to 
promote the mission of an organization. A security control should support normal functioning of operations. This emphasizes 
the role of usability, as an attribute balancing the security needs with the needs of user to ensure that protections do not 
hinder critical functions. Another attribute relevant for our context is the risk reduction or mitigation. This attribute is the 
ability of protective technologies to reduce or remove outstanding risks to a government entity.  
User security  
In the context of critical government functions, it becomes extremely vital to understand the user’s intent towards IS and its 
protective technologies, on a spectrum from positive to negative (Stanton et al, 2005). A factor of this is the user’s actions, or 
their actual actions towards those same entities. This is one of the dimensions of user’s behavior, with the other dimension 
being “user expertise.”  The latter dimension describes user’s knowledge of the organizational environment, both technical 
and non-technical (Stanton et al, 2005). Technical knowledge refers to the user’s savvy with technical assets. On the other 
hand, non-technical knowledge involves user’s awareness about security policy and various controls to protect information 
assets and organizational mission.  
Security effectiveness 
“Security benefits” within e-Government context remains the most important measure of success with an information 
security program. As argued in Wood (1991), “the benefits of information security cannot be characterized definitively with 
traditional cost-benefit analysis” (pp.399).  Some attributes include cost savings, time-savings, regulatory compliance, and 
enhanced security culture. Cost savings can be measured as a reduction in extraneous budgetary spending on security 
concerns. Time-savings can be measured as a reduction in man-hours spent dealing with security incidents, both internal and 
external. Regulatory compliance is a measure of the adherence to applicable regulatory requirements. Finally, enhancing the 
organizational security culture can be described as the creation or promotion of a culture among users who are constantly and 
consistently aware of threats to the IS and their role in its protection. Government organizations will benefit from all of the 
above, with the added advantage of direct conservation of taxpayer money while securing critical information assets from 
unknown threats. CSIS (2009) recommends government to treat cybersecurity as “… a strategic issue on par with weapons of 
mass destruction and global jihad …” (p. 15). 
Government organizations that choose to apply the proposed security model potentially stand to improve their overall 
security stance by creating a positive cycle. However, a possible limitation of this treatment is the need to complete 
supplementary, potentially unnecessary steps in order to meet regulatory requirements. In addition, the organization will 
require strong leadership that understands how to define information security success within that organization’s context, 
necessitating individuals who understand both information security and needs of the organization. In contrast, a government 
entity that chooses to continue with the status quo could very well follow the guidance to the letter while generating 
excessive paperwork and neglecting more important dimensions of information security. On paper, this organization could 
look prepared to face cyber threats based on a checklist or minimum requirements, but without considering the government 
context and user behavior, could in reality be woefully ill equipped. 
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DISCUSSING EMERGENT ISSUES 
There are many challenges facing government organizations as they attempt to transform into e-Government organizations. 
Some of these include balancing the need to be as secure as possible with the growing requirement to provide e-enabled 
services to both citizens and other government and non-government organizations; introducing change into an environment 
that is unprepared or unwilling to change; and securing critical assets with a mandated set of tools that may be less 
sophisticated than the attacks occurring against the IS. While the information security success model proposed within this 
paper cannot eliminate these issues, it could help address these challenges by better focusing organizational efforts on the true 
path to information security: defining what success means to the organization, operationalizing the constructs that lead to 
success for that organization, and understanding the intervening power of users interacting with the information system. By 
doing these things, an organization can better assure the privacy and safety of the information assets that will power 
government transformation for years to come. 
After reviewing the various approaches that information security researchers have taken, several observations have been 
made. First, an emphasis has been placed on many “means to the end.” A good number of research studies have focused on 
measures to address one or more of the core dimensions, such as technical security, risk management, or security culture. 
While this is undoubtedly valuable research, it is a mistake to believe that securing the technical assets of an organization 
while neglecting other dimensions will facilitate a secure organization. Information security must be viewed as a continual, 
interactive process rather than a single “fix.” 
Another issue is with the placement of emphasis on individual dimensions and not their interactions. Again, many studies 
have focused on individual dimensions. However, a limited number of studies have focused on the interaction between the 
dimensions. This is important, as the model shows a causal process, particularly with the intervening power of the user and 
their behavior. More studies need to be directed at the whole life cycle of information security and how different dimensions 
interact and affect each other. 
This information is powerful from both a research and a practitioner standpoint for a variety of reasons. First, organizations 
can use the findings to better focus their attention towards dimensions that actually constitute success. Better focusing the 
attention and assets of the organization will save time and money, thus creating additional value and further enabling the 
business. From a research perspective, the conceptualized model will provide ample opportunity for empirical study in a 
variety of organizational contexts, such as within emergent organizations. Broadly, emergent organizations (along with their 
noncomitant information systems) are constantly changing (Baskerville and Siponen, 2002). These types of organizational 
structures can benefit from a more straightforward approach to information security. Finally, this research will help bridge 
the gap between extensive work that has been done in both information systems success and information security disciplines.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, significant literature has been reviewed to better understand different elements of information security success 
that have been proposed by researchers. From this literature, six interrelated elements have emerged as core dimensions of 
information security success. From these findings a parsimonious model for IS security success has been proposed. In 
addition, utility of the model within the context of e-Government has been discussed. The model introduced in this paper 
should be useful for future research efforts in several ways. The security elements of the model have never been studied as 
interrelated dimensions of an encompassing model. Research on these relationships would provide a better understanding of 
the interaction between security structure within an organization and an individual utilizing the information system and its 
protective technologies. In addition, applying the model within various organizational contexts would provide a better 
understanding of how information security varies within these contexts.  
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